Freedom in the New Testament

Larry Hurtado, Professor of New Testament Language, Literature and Theology at The University of Edinburgh, in an essay on "Freed by Love and for Love: Freedom in the New Testament" summarizes the relation between the biblical idea of freedom and modern ideas of political freedom:

As we have noted earlier, the NT does not teach about political liberation because the sorts of actions open today (especially political organization) were not available or even conceived then. But the strong affirmation and enhancement of personal moral agency in the NT are most compatible with social and political environments that make ample room for freedom of conscience and action. The agapē urged in the NT requires a real measure of personal freedom in order to be exercised authentically. It is not possible to render the love advocated in the NT under compulsion and coercion. So, e.g., freedom of religion and conscience, and freedom from intimidation and oppressive social relationships are essential for the cultivation of opportunities for true faith and loving freedom to be exercised.

Hurtado's essay could be a very helpful resource for preachers doing research for sermons on liberty and freedom. I wish I had found it before last Sunday's July 4th sermon. Most valuable are his insights regarding the relation of love (agape) and freedom:

In this NT emphasis upon agapē as the central responsibility that believers owe to others, we see the profoundly social dimension to NT freedom. There simply is no extended attention given to freedom as the exercise of power on ones own behalf and without having to consider others. The only freedom that we see advocated in the NT is one that requires others for it to be exercised. One cannot exhibit this distinctive freedom except in relationship to others.

The common form of Roman freedom likewise required others (especially slaves) in order for it to be to be exercised, indeed, even for it to be defined. But this kind of freedom was always at the expense of others, their labor and service enabling one to enjoy a freedom from labor and service. Moreover, as noted briefly already, in all the typical notions of freedom in the Roman era (and in our day as well), whether national, social/political, or inward-philosophical, to take account of others (other peoples/nations, groups, or persons), to allow one’s actions to be shaped by others, represents either a real or potential threat to one’s freedom, or, at best a necessary constraint upon one’s freedom (e.g., in the interests of social peace). In short, there is no positive role of others in this sort of idea of freedom, except perhaps, e.g., that one’s freedom from manual labor or other objectionable tasks required others to perform these tasks. One’s leisure was typically enabled directly by the labor of others, especially slaves.

In the NT, however, freedom is not to be exercised at the expense of others but with their interests and needs in mind. It is precisely the freedom to be "for others." That is, the freedom advocated in the NT requires others, not to relieve one from labor, but as objects of the love that comprises this freedom. This definition of freedom is, to my knowledge, unprecedented in the Roman world. Indeed, most people, then and now, for whom freedom consists in autarchy would likely not recognize as freedom what the NT advocates. This radically different view of freedom simply has to be faced seriously in considering what kind of contribution the NT might make to our concerns today. In any case, this idea of freedom-for-love/others is perhaps the most notable and distinctive feature of freedom in the NT.