There's a series of disastrous mistakes. We just heard the Secretary of State say these were tactical mistakes. These were not tactical mistakes. These were strategic mistakes, mistakes of policies made back here. Don't blame the troops. They've been magnificent. If anything saves us, it will be them.
A couple weeks ago retired Major General Paul Eaton called for Rumsfeld's resignation.
6 comments:
Of course Zinni never actually served under Rumsfeld (he left the military in September 2000) and is being actively courted for political office by the Democrats.
Jeff the Baptist,
So? Your point?
General Shinseki, Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army 1999-2003 was scorned by this administration and Rumsfeld said he was "far off the mark" when Shinseki said several hundred thousand troops would be needed to secure the peace in Iraq. As it turns out, the General was right on the mark. This administration would do well to listen to those who have had experience in peacemaking. But then again, Bush and his cronies aren't interested in that.
To Jeff -- so what if Zinni is being courted by the Democrats ... the truth is still the truth.
"so what if Zinni is being courted by the Democrats ... the truth is still the truth."
When I was a lad, we had a unit on telling fact from opinion. Perhaps you need something of the sort? What Zinni gives is opinion, expert opinion certainly considering he was the CinC of CentCom, but opinion nonetheless. It is not fact and certainly not truth.
Zinni was out of the military before 9/11. Among other things that means any plans he had are completely out of date with the massive shift in national defense policy that occurred post-Towers. The "more men" approach he (and others) suggest is not without it's problems considering how even the current force levels are straining logistics and manpower. And that isn't even taking into account conflict of interest issues that a possible run for office may cause.
Shinseki was out of step with policy as well. The defense department has been going light, fast, and responsive since the Clinton Administration. The pace of this transformation accelerated with the WoT because a light, fast force is far more useful against insurgents than a heavy and slow one. Shinseki was from the heavy and slow school and stood in the way of that transformation.
These are men from the same school of thought: go heavy, go slow, hit an any with a hammer. They are certainly entitled to their expert opinions. However there are plenty of generals and other experts who do not share those opinions and all they are is opinions.
Shinseki may have been out of touch with policy, but he was certainly in touch with reality.
Ask my son how the "light" unit of the 1st Cav faired down in Yusifiyah against the insurgents. His "heavy" unit had to go down there and save the day. It was ugly.
I was a Marine attached to the 24th MEU in Mahmudiya. We were the first to invade Yusufiyah and completely defeated the insurgents there. 1st Cav came in an completely dropped the ball in that area and that is why the Army had to call in the 10th Mountain Division. The tactics that 1st Cav and other Mechanized Army units use are not sufficient for the war in Iraq and I think many are finally realizing that.
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